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IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
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Abstract: The relationship between accounting and governmentality,
and the increasing statutory regulation of companies by central gov-
ernment during the 19th century have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion from accounting historians. Conversely, accounting change
within local authorities in this period has attracted far less attention.
The paper examines the consequences of the increase in public ac-
countability of local authorities in England and Wales in the context
of the Newcastle Corporation, the body responsible for collecting and
distributing the town’s wealth. During the first half of the 19th cen-
tury Newcastle Corporation was heavily criticized for neglecting the
improvement of the River Tyne. The paper illustrates how the
Newcastle Corporation and those opposed to it used accounting as a
lobbying tool to promote their interests. Gallhofer and Haslam [2001,
p. 29] showed how, in the late 19th century, “radical political activ-
ists” used accounting data through the medium of the press as an
“emancipatory” practice. In many ways, the case of the improvement
of the River Tyne during the early 19th century also reveals the use of
accounting as an ‘emancipatory’ force by opposition groups. The pa-
per finds that the Corporation used accounting data to justify inac-
tion and the opposition used accounting data to promote its objec-
tives. These contests resulted in the control of the River Tyne being
taken from the Corporation and placed in the hands of a trust in
1850.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between accounting and governmentality
during the 19th century is a key issue in the accounting lit-
erature. For example, Armstrong [1994, p. 41] describes how a
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“second generation of Foucault-inspired work” has explored the
role of accounting in facilitating governmental “action at a dis-
tance” [see also Callon, 1980; Latour, 1986, 1987; Miller and
O’Leary, 1989; Miller, 1990; Miller and O’Leary, 1990; Miller,
1991; Robson, 1991; Rose, 1991; Preston, 1992]. A more recent
example is Neu’s [1999, p. 79] study of the indigenous people of
Canada in the 19th century, which examined the contribution of
accounting to the British military machinery of empire. Neu
showed that it was only with the aid of accounting that “distant
territories and their occupants” could be governed by the Impe-
rial government in London.
The increasing statutory regulation of company accounts by
central government during the 19th century is another area that
has spawned many studies. Most historians concur with
Edwards et al [1997, p. 4] that “the emergence of the joint stock
company gave rise to the need for published accounting infor-
mation”. An early study by Hein [1978] and a more recent study
by Maltby [1999] examined regulation in the context of the de-
velopment of the accounting profession. Hein stated that it was
through statutory regulation that accounting control has often
been achieved [p. 75]. Maltby [1999] examined the “factors in
the emergence of a new jurisdiction” in relation to the establish-
ment of a statutory framework through the Joint Stock Compa-
nies Act, 1844 which provided the first statutory steps towards
accountability within companies, and the subsequent climb
down in 1856. Storrar and Pratt [2000] enhanced the study of
statutory regulation by considering “the causes of secrecy and
the circumstances in which it [UK company law] came into
conflict with accountability in registered companies in the UK
[1844-1904]” [p. 259]. They concluded that there was an increas-
ing acceptance by directors of the need for accountability to
investors but this often conflicted with the “perceived need for
commercial secrecy” [p. 285]. Jones and Aiken [1995, p. 78],
expanding on an earlier paper by Parker [1990], explained
changes in the statutory framework in the context of a “distinct
cultural evolution”.
Conversely, accounting change within local authorities dur-
ing the 19th century has attracted far less attention. Studies by
the Webbs [1906, 1908] and Fraser [1979] examined local gov-
ernment in Britain from the Glorious Revolution, 1688/9, to the
Municipal Reform Act, 1835, and during the Victorian era re-
spectively, from a distinctly political and economic point of
view. Moreover, the main accounting studies relating to ‘local
government’ have tended to take the form of an overview, some
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more detailed than others, of the statutory and accounting
changes over the century following the 1835 Act. Most notably,
Coombs and Edwards’ [1993, 1996] case studies describe the
accounting methods of several corporations and explain why
accounting changes occurred. They also looked at the account-
ing procedures implemented by the evolving professional bodies
which, by the end of the 19th century, started to form what we
now call public sector accountants. Other studies have been pro-
duced by Edwards [1992] and Jones [1989, 1992].
There have been a handful of studies of particular corpora-
tions. Livock [1965], for example, produced a descriptive analy-
sis focusing on the progress and development of the accounting
system of the Bristol Corporation for the years 1532-1835, but
did not venture beyond the Municipal Reform Act, 1835. There
has been one study of the Newcastle Corporation. Halcrow
[1953] wrote two papers in the “Mr. Treasurer” series in the
Local Government Finance Journal. Her papers provide a de-
scriptive outline of the development of the accounting and ad-
ministrative role of the Common Council from the earliest ex-
tant records to 1835. Halcrow clearly shows that it was the
Common Council who controlled the administration of the
town’s finance by issuing orders “no less than royal charters”
[p. 151]. Again, however, the study did not go beyond the 1835
Act and into what Coombs and Edwards [1993, 1996], Edwards
[1992] and Jones [1989, 1992] would describe as the ‘watershed’
years in the way that local authorities approached accounting.
The current study explores the consequences of the increase
in public accountability of local authorities in England and
Wales in the context of the Newcastle Corporation and the im-
provement of the River Tyne in the first half of the 19th century,
a subject not previously examined. During this period, New-
castle Corporation became increasingly accountable for the river
with the publication of accounting data. This data was exploited
by an ever-expanding opposition who objected to the continuing
neglect of the River Tyne and its port facilities. Even though the
majority of the Corporation’s income came from the river, only
a small amount was expended on its improvement. There had
been pressure amongst traders to improve the river early on, but
it was only with the publication by the Corporation of annual
accounts of receipts and payments that the extent of the neglect
became visible and the opposition, comprising members of the
press, corporation and interested parties from the localities,
gathered forces and change was ultimately achieved.
The study takes the issue of local authority accounting
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further. It illustrates how the municipal reforms that took place
(most importantly during the first half of the 19th century)
allowed both opposition and councils to use accounting as a
lobbying tool to promote their interests. As will be seen, opposi-
tion to the Newcastle Corporation utilized accounting data to
place a great deal of pressure on the Corporation. It did so
through the mediums of public meetings, petitioning and, most
importantly, voicing claims through the press. Newcastle Corpo-
ration, on the other hand, reciprocated by using the accounting
data to justify their inaction over the River Tyne. Therefore, the
study supports the hypothesis that accounts are used to promote
economic interests, irrespective of the explicit purpose for
which that information was prepared [Watts and Zimmermann,
1979; Oldroyd, 2001].
The field research for this study consisted primarily of an
examination of the archival records and minutes relating to the
River Tyne and Newcastle Corporation. These are found in the
Tyne and Wear Archives and in the local studies sections of
Newcastle upon Tyne Central Library and University of
Newcastle upon Tyne Library.
The study is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the historical background to the study. The third section
looks at the development of accounting within Newcastle Corpo-
ration and other local authorities in the early part of the 19th
century. Section four explains the Corporation’s reluctance to
improve the River Tyne. The final section draws together the
main arguments and focuses on the Corporation’s use of ac-
counting data to justify inaction, and the opposition’s use of
accounting data in promoting their interests. It is argued that
the outcomes of this conflict were parliamentary bills and ‘Ad-
miralty Enquiries’ in 1849 and the eventual decision to place the
control of the Tyne in the hands of a trust in 1850.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1600, Queen Elizabeth’s “Great Charter” gave monopoly
control over the coal trade and principal council offices in
Newcastle to the Hostmans’ Company1 in return for a shilling
tax on every chaldron (a measurement of coal) of coal shipped
1 Mackenzie [1827, pp. 703-704] traces the Hostmans’ Company’s origin
back to a statute of Henry IV, in 1404 where they “seem to have been a kind of
mediator between buyers and sellers”. They loaded and unloaded the trade, at
this time the bulk of which was coal and stones.
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from the River Tyne. Six years later the Hostmans’ Company
gained the right to exercise Admiralty jurisdiction over the Tyne
and with this came the responsibility to improve and maintain
the river. Trinity House, which was established in London by
royal charter in 1514, had control over the ports in the areas of
London, Newcastle, Hull and Leith. Comprised of masters,
pilots, seamen and merchant navy captains, its role was to regu-
late pilotage on the Tyne as well as act as a general lighthouse
authority and charitable organization for the relief of mariners.
In Newcastle: “The river jury2 (who sat in the Court of Admi-
ralty) was formerly composed of the gentlemen of the trinity-
house, who were by far the fittest men for the purpose . . . the
corporation thwarted the river jury, that the corporation com-
plied with many requests which the river jury had refused to
comply with and that, in consequence of all this, the river jury of
trinity-house gentlemen gave up in disgust . . . then were suc-
ceeded by the cobblers, tailors, saddlers, slaters, smiths and the
like [appointed by the Corporation]” [Mitchell, 1823, p. 17].
During the latter part of the 17th century, political alle-
giance played a large part in the make-up of the Newcastle Cor-
poration. Following the resignation of the brethren of Trinity
House, the Corporation was free to use its ancient electionary
powers to fill the positions available on the river jury with men
from the mysteries and societies3 of Newcastle who favored their
views. Consequently, at the time of Mitchell’s writing, the river
jury was composed of “only two or three . . . [who] know any
better how to conserve the navigation than they know how to
navigate a ship to New Zealand” [ibid, p.12]. As a result, the
River Tyne remained neglected and there was very little change
in the way the Corporation was directed and controlled in
2 This jury was made up of members from the various trades and bye-trades
[see footnote 3]. The majority were not qualified in river matters but made up
the corporation committees by virtue of their position in political society. They
were responsible and Mitchell [1823, p. 18] implies subservient, to the corpora-
tion and for conservatorship of the Tyne.
3 There were 12 Companies called Mysteries, representing groups of traders.
These were Merchants, Mercers, Drapers, Skinners, Tailors, Saddlers, Bakers
and Brewers, Tanners, Cordwainers, Butchers, Smiths, Fullers and Dyers. The
earliest trade incorporated in 1436 (Smiths) and the last in 1621 (Butchers).
There were also 15 societies called Bye-Trades. These were not Mysteries. These
were Mariners, Weavers, Barber Surgeons, Cutlers, Shipwrights, Coopers, House
Carpenters, Masons, Glovers, Joiners, Millers, Curriers, Paviours, Slaters and
Glaziers. The earliest trade incorporated in 1426 (Coopers) and the last in 1656
(Paviours).
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Newcastle until well into the early part of the 19th century when
the political climate started to change.
The Corporation was aware of the navigation problems of
the river as large sums of money were spent on assessing the
conditions of the Tyne. The most significant report was by John
Rennie, canal and river engineer, costing in excess of £2,000.
His report as to “the best mode of improving its navigation”,
produced in 1816, was to be a “benchmark” for the future im-
provement of the Tyne [River Committee, 1836]. However, his
cost estimate for improving the river of £519,320 (more than ten
times their annual total receipts) dominated the Corporation’s
attitude towards carrying out any major improvement for years
to come. It was recently commented: “The cost of his scheme
was of major concern to the city and erring on the side of cau-
tion, the report was accepted but no action taken” [Port of Tyne,
1999, p. 43].
The state of the River Tyne, described as a “cursed horse
pond” [Mitchell, 1823, p. 27] in the late 18th century, worsened
through the inaction of the Corporation. There are numerous
accounts of traders complaining to the Corporation that ships
were running aground and or unable to get into the port due to
the silting up of the river. Damage was being done to ships. The
comment of one trader was typical: “It [is] a most difficult thing
to charter a vessel in the Mediterranean, though coppered . . .
they said they received greater injury to their bottom in the
Tyne, than at any other place they went to; and that its repair
cost more than any addition which was made to the freight”
[Newcastle Town Council Proceedings (NTCP), 1840, p. 9].
Despite such complaints the Newcastle Corporation re-
mained unmoved. As Guthrie [1880, p. 5] explained “The press-
ing necessity for enlarged harbor facilities to meet the require-
ments of modern commerce, and to withstand the competition
of other ports was, apparently, not sufficiently felt. There seems
likewise to have been a . . . great fear that the town’s revenue
would be uselessly squandered in embarking on such an enter-
prise”.
In Newcastle foreign trade started to increase towards the
end of the 1830s when the doors were opened to trade with
India, China and the Levant. Improved shipping technology and
design enabled ships to carry more and at a faster rate, increas-
ing the volume of trade, especially with Germany and Holland.
However, the Tyne was not well placed to take advantage of this.
One councillor commented that “The River did not afford that
accommodation to the increasing commerce and trade of the
6
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port, which was imperatively demanded” [NTCP, 1839, p. 5]. A
report of the Newcastle Corporation’s Committee on Trade
stated “The most obvious means of increasing the trade of the
port, within the power of the Council, is the improvement of the
River” [ibid]. A comment made in the Tyne Mercury [1833],
shows that rivers were being better managed elsewhere, such as
on the River Clyde where “[River dues] are kept distinct from
the Corporation’s funds, and are laid out in deepening and im-
proving the river and harbour and in discharging the debt of the
trust” [Tyne Mercury, 1833].
Trade figures from Johnson and Aughton [1925, p. 40] show
that greater improvements occurred after 1850, when, by an Act
of Parliament, control of the River Tyne was taken from the
Corporation and given to a body named the Tyne Improvement
Commission purposely created to control the affairs of the river.
The number of foreign vessels trading inwards to the port was
708 in 1843 and 1477 in 1863. The number of foreign vessels
trading outwards from the port was 4088 in 1843 and 8074 in
1863.
What the Corporation did spend money on prior to 1850 in
the name of improvement was called “Pound Foolish” expendi-
ture because it did not improve the River Tyne. For example, the
purchase of a dredger, was described in the press as a “DESPI-
CABLE machine which, at an expense of £3,000 . . . is only fit to
clean out a gentleman’s fish-pond, and perhaps not that” [Tyne
Mercury, 1838]. Mackenzie [1827] tells us that the Corporation
“were so far roused to a sense of their duty” as to employ Rennie
and presumably the same went for Cubbit. Engineers, who were
asked to report on the condition and improvement of the Tyne,
often had little local knowledge and although their engineering
abilities could be applied to any locality their commercial and
financial knowledge could not: “[They] had not sufficient knowl-
edge of the traffic on the river to offer any opinion respecting it”
[NTCP, 1838, p. 6]. These engineers’ estimates for improvement,
based on vastly inflated London prices, created an over-prudent
Corporation and caused it to err on the side of caution. This was
the case in Rennie’s report of 1816 and in Cubitt’s report of
1837:
Extending the quay and applying the dredging machine
to the river . . . the sum [required] would alarm the
Council . . . Mr Cubitt calculated that the works could
not be conducted together at a less annual sum than
10,000l . . . (Councillor Doubleday) and the River Com-
mittee also, were of opinion that the two designs could
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be carried into execution at an annual sum consider-
ably less: and this opinion they grounded on the fact of
having made enquiries of builders and others, as to the
prices of stone, labour etc. in this part of the kingdom
as compared with the prices in London, on which Mr
Cubitt had formed his estimates [NTCP,1837, p. 1].
The River Tyne was seen as requiring huge investment be-
fore any great benefit could be obtained, and the Corporation
prioritized town and other expenses out of their limited funds.
The Corporation often directing whatever expenditure it liked
for the improvement of the town:
It had been proposed to build new Town Courts, Corpo-
rate Offices and Judge’s Lodging House . . . [One coun-
cillor] had been astonished to hear one gentleman say,
that not only might the ground in question be involved
in this expenditure, but that they might expend any
sum they pleased upon it — while the river Tyne, from
which they derived the greatest portion of their rev-
enues, and upon the improvement of which a large por-
tion should consequently be expended, was to be left
entirely out of consideration [NTCP, 1838, p. 22].
Local and resident engineers also produced reports on the
condition and improvement of the River Tyne, but perhaps it
was felt by the Corporation that these men were not of sufficient
standing to arouse opposition to their policy on the river. Conse-
quently, eminent engineers were brought in to survey a river
Tyne which everyone recognized was in need of huge invest-
ment. The scale of the investment required meant that the Cor-
poration would not be able to avoid debt and reduce costs, a
policy they strongly adhered to. All the time and money spent on
engineers’ reports was arguably wasted as, more often than not,
the reports were buried and little, if any, action was taken to
improve this vital artery of commerce.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES
At the beginning of the period of this study “Corporations
were private rather than public institutions, responsible to their
members, the freemen, rather than to the citizens at large and
committed to property interests rather than to the welfare of the
town” [Fraser, 1979, p. 2]. Each corporation had its own ap-
proach to accounting. As far as Newcastle Corporation was con-
cerned, accounting techniques were “firmly established in medi-
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eval times” and the main focus of its financial management was
to avoid debt and minimize costs [Halcrow, 1953, p. 152]. The
state of the accounts prior to 1809 “showed the total receipts,
total payments and the balance at the end of the year in three
lines” [NTCP, 1833, p. 86]. The County Rate Act, 1815 required
local authorities to publish their accounts. Halcrow [1953, p.
200] tells us that it was at this time that pressure was placed on
Newcastle Corporation to publish its accounts: “In the early de-
cades of the 19th century it was recognized that there was room
for improvement in the methods of book-keeping . . . a number
of petitions addressed to the Common Council by the Stewards
of the Incorporated Companies focused attention on the ac-
counts and prepared the way for change”.
Until their publication in pamphlet form by the Newcastle
Corporation from 1818, the accounts could only be inspected by
Companies and Freemen4 and “only a very few copies of the
Corporation accounts are printed annually from a statement
given to the stewards by their auditors” [Mackenzie, 1827, p.
640]. There were 24 auditors in total, two from each of the 12
mysteries. The auditors were often elected by “attending the
election meeting” [ibid, p. 637] rather than according to ability.
They were often the subject of severe criticism:
During many years the auditors placed large sums under
one head, without any proper explanation . . . merely signed the
chamber-clerks general account, as entered into the book, with-
out examining either bills or receipts . . . (a) consequence of this
neglect of duty in the auditors, negligence and corruption began
to creep into the revenue department of the Corporation, until at
length a spirit of dissatisfaction spread through the whole bur-
gesses [ibid].
In 1809 most of the mysteries nominated men who “ap-
peared willing and qualified to fulfil their oath”5 [ibid] and the
unsatisfactory accounting procedures of the past were exposed.
For example, auditors found substantial arrears due to the
Corporation. They also discovered accounts from former years
4 All members of the Newcastle Corporation were Freemen and had vested
interests in the town. They elected the Common Council and monopolised the
powers and offices of town government before the 1835 reform.
5 The role of the auditors as defined by the Town Clerk of Newcastle at the
1834 Municipal Corporation Investigation was as follows: “they audit and com-
pare all accounts with the vouchers, and see that there is an order from the
governing body for each payment. These are their admitted functions; but they
take upon themselves to make recommendations to the common council”.
9
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that had never been closed and on which it was resolved “that
the whole accounts be laid before us this year, or we will not
sign the book” [1809, Auditors report of proceedings]. After a
short dispute with the Corporation, the auditors obtained the
remaining books and accounts requested and were able to com-
plete the audit. In 1823 “the accounts were published in a pam-
phlet form and all the details clearly arranged under distinct
heads” [Mackenzie, 1827, p. 641]. Cook [1961] adds that “In
1830 the auditors secured the publication in full of the corpora-
tion accounts . . . this was a substantial victory in a battle that
had lasted since 1809” [p. 222].
Accounting reform occurred at different times across the
U.K. Glamorgan Corporation’s accounts were published in the
Bristol Gazette in 1793.6 Nottingham Corporation’s accounts
were available for inspection by local freemen in 1795.
Middlesex Corporation first printed accounts in 1815 and
Liverpool Corporation did so in 1816 “as a result of popular
agitation” [Livock, 1965, p. 100]. The early 19th century saw
increasing resentment that political power in the municipalities
was in the hands of a wealthy few. This sparked the move for a
‘Municipal Investigation’ and new corporations were formed un-
der the Municipal Reform Act, 1835. This Act applied to 184
English and Welsh boroughs and attempted to bring corpora-
tions more in line with the social and demographic changes
brought about by industrial progress and ultimately make them
more accountable to the ratepayers.
Prior to 1835, charge and discharge accounting was widely
used in many boroughs. However, Coombs and Edwards [1996,
p. 48] comment that some boroughs also used double entry
bookkeeping because “Charge/discharge accounting proved in-
adequate to meet the needs of municipal corporations due to the
number, nature and rapidly expanding range of transactions un-
dertaken during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries”.
After a second statute was passed in 1835, the Municipal
Corporations Act, corporations were obliged to produce an an-
nual return of receipts and expenditure and “a full abstract of
his [the Treasurer’s] accounts” to be available for inspection and
purchase by the ratepayers “on payment of a reasonable price
for each copy” [Municipal Corporations Act (MCA) 1835, S.93].
6 It is likely that they were published in Bristol as well as Glamorgan be-
cause Bristol was the main trading centre in the south west of England.
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The Act did not mention the form the abstract should take but
did state that it “should show all monies received . . . and dis-
bursed” [ibid, S.60]. Furthering the accountability of corpora-
tions, ratepayers could also inspect the corporation’s books, ac-
counts and minutes. However, as Edwards [1992, p. 68] tells us
“the amount of financial information these contained varied
considerably from one authority to another”.
One can clearly see from the accounts of the Newcastle
Corporation, [see Figures 1-4], great improvement in the level of
detailed disclosure, rendering the activities of the Corporation
more open to social and political debate. In 1809 [Figure 1] the
accounts, in a receipts and disbursements format, show very
little detail. Most notable is the disbursement title “General Pay-
ments” with a large sum of £16,413 (nearly half the total
amount) and no further explanation. By the time of the first
publication nine years later, of accounts in a “Receipts” and
“Payments” form, there had been some improvement in the level
of disclosure [Figure 2]. In 1833-1835, the accounts were headed
“Charge” and “Discharge” for the first time and the printed cop-
ies contained printed names which acted as a signature of the
accounts for the year ending 1835 [Figure 3]. One noticeable
feature of the accounts is the attention to detail on the “Pay-
ments” side, with added notes of explanation. By the end of the
period of study, the level of disclosure was much greater than in
previous years [Figure 4].
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
As a product of the 1835 Act, the newly formed Newcastle
Corporation consisted of men from a wide range of business
activities — booksellers, tanners, bankers, printers, manufactur-
ers, lawyers, doctors, but only one shipowner. The Corporation
had no representation from other towns located on the River
Tyne. Towns such as South and North Shields and Gateshead
were desperate to see the river improved. Further, the represen-
tation of nautical and trading interests on the Corporation will-
ing to voice concerns about the river was not significant. Most
representatives enjoyed the power they gained from their corpo-
rate position and remained silent on the subject of river im-
provement to remain popular with the rate-paying voters. The
majority of the Newcastle Corporation elect, made up of ‘56
gentlemen’; had substantial property interests in the town and
preferred efficient roadways and local utilities to river improve-
ment: “The Municipal Corporation, which owned and taxed the
11
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harbour represented none of these interests, and by reason of its
legal rights to devote the proceeds of its petty customs duties for
its own advantage, was even pecuniary biased against them all”
[Webb, 1908, p. 724].
An article in the Tyne Mercury [1833] clearly shows the un-
derlying reason why the Newcastle Corporation adopted a policy
of inaction:
The annual average receipts of the Corporation for the
eighteen years immediately preceding 1827, amounted
to £38,142 while the annual balance in the hutch7 [the
amount left-over at the end of the year] never exceeded
£2,000. Now if nearly one-half their income were cur-
tailed [i.e. to be expended on the improvement of the
river], it is manifest that their power, and various influ-
ence, would be considerably broken down . . . [due to
less revenue available] this is sufficient to explain what
has so long been a paradox to the public, namely, that
many members of the Corporation, who are largely en-
gaged in trade and manufactures, and are fully aware of
the great general benefit that would result from the im-
provement of the river, do, not withstanding, in their
corporate capacity, refuse their concurrence to any very
expensive scheme of amendment, and thus, so far,
counteract their individual private interests. They make
this sacrifice rather than see the pomp and glory of the
Corporation reduced to depend on £20,000 a year, or
that their patronage should be in the least diminished.
PROMOTION OF INTERESTS THROUGH ACCOUNTS
The main argument of the paper is that it was the publica-
tion of accounts that made the neglect of the River Tyne visible
to an emerging opposition (the press, councillors and petitioners
mainly headed by the people of Shields). Further, that responsi-
bility for the improvement of the river was taken from the Cor-
poration and, in 1850, as a result of pressure, was placed in the
hands of the Tyne Improvement Commission. However, the Cor-
poration also used the accounts to justify its own inaction. The
paper now examines these issues under three sub-headings: the
7 “A large chest (that contained the town’s money) with nine separate locks,
each of a different pattern. The mayor and each of the eight chamberlains (they
were elected from amongst the burgesses and assisted the clerks of the chamber)
had a key so that the chest could not be opened unless all nine were present
together” [Halcrow, 1953, p. 152].
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case for change, the defense by the Corporation, and the pro-
ceedings of the Admiralty Enquiry that, ultimately, dealt the
final blow.
The Case for Change: Early accounts of opposition to the
Newcastle Corporation’s reluctance to improve the River Tyne
can be traced to the 17th century when a series of papers titled
“Conservatorship of the River Tyne” appeared [published 1849].
The line of argument centered on the physical condition of the
river. It was Captain Phipps, a well-respected 18th century mari-
ner, who considered the Tyne to be “capable of becoming one of
the finest rivers in the world, but which ignorance, inattention,
and avarice” had converted into what he called a “cursed horse
pond!” [Mitchell, 1823, p. 27]. In another instance, a call was
made for a public general meeting because “the navigation is
likely to sustain much further injury” unless action was taken. It
was intended that “nobility, gentry, merchants, coal owners and
ship owners and all other interested in preserving the navigation
of the river Tyne will attend” [Lawson, 1799].
Publication of annual accounts enhanced the accountability
of the Corporation to the rate-payers. It was during the 1830s
that the financial arguments came to the fore which were to
dominate the battle for the power over the River Tyne. A peti-
tion was made to King William by the free burgesses of
Newcastle upon Tyne in 1832. This was during the election of
the Common Council and a majority of the burgesses8, tired of
the “Toryism in Newcastle” [Cook, 1965, p. 212], were “in favour
of upsetting the controlling power of the Common Council”
[ibid, pp. 225-226]. The petition asked for an enquiry to be es-
tablished into the mismanagement and poor state of the river.
The petition was littered with proofs and references to the pub-
lished annual accounts. For example, an extract from the peti-
tion read:
It appears from the accounts . . . that from the year
1821 to 1831, both years inclusive, a period of 11 years,
the sum of 217,833l. 1s. 83⁄4d. has been received by the
corporation of Newcastle (relating to the river income)
. . . that the paltry sum of 1,265l. 12s. 9d. only, was
during the period, expended in either improving the
navigation of the river, or facilitating shipping, trade,
8 “An inhabitant charged with the defence of the place in which he lived,
and, in return for his military services, was entitled to certain privileges and
immunities” [Mackenzie, 1827, p. 652].
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and commerce, or in deepening the bed of the river or
otherwise . . . [While] a clear revenue of upward of six-
teen thousand pounds is yearly drained from the public
without any check [Macgregor, 1832, p. 4].
The monetary values used in the petition were based on the
authority of Mackenzie’s History of Newcastle [1827] and stated
that: “During the three years preceding 1827, the Corporation
received from the river £74,764 . . . out of which was paid
£22,472 . . . leaving £49,291 . . . or an average annual income of
£17,291 . . . deduct £1,291 . . . for the salaries of the harbour
master and petty officers employed on the river, there will re-
main a sum of £16,000 a year available to the improvement of
the river” [ibid, pp.18-19].
Prior to the 1835 Act the Corporation kept all dues and
revenues in one general account. With the majority of the rev-
enue generated from the Tyne and no distinction in the general
account to the source of this revenue, it was difficult to deter-
mine what funds were generated from the river and less likely to
be returned. This revenue was administered with “cool and in-
exorable partiality” towards the town [Tyne Mercury, 1833].
However, the neglect of the Tyne in favor of the town be-
came even clearer when the new form of keeping the accounts
was made public by the newly reformed Corporation and when
revenues were classified under different heads and in more de-
tail. Extant accounting information showed clearly how reluc-
tant the Corporation was to direct any substantial expenditure
towards the improvement of the River Tyne [see Figures 1-4],
even though there was great pressure from a growing opposition
for them to do so: “We cannot wonder that feelings of the public
should be most sensitive on a port of such vital importance to
the interests of the community at large” [Armstrong, 1836, p. 1]
One of the main activists using the accounting data was
William Mitchell. He wrote during the 1820s and 30s in the Tyne
Mercury under the alias of “Tim Tunbelly” or “Peter Putright”.
The letters of the former were later compiled and published in a
book [Mitchell, 1823]. Mitchell invited comments and promoted
awareness through the medium of the press. Gallhofer and
Haslam, [2001, p. 29] showed how in the late 19th century “radi-
cal political activists” used accounting data through the medium
of the press as an “emancipatory” rather than “repressive . . .
praxis” and they noted “how few studies have [articulated] ac-
counting in the context of social struggle”. In many ways, the
opposition in the case of the River Tyne during the early 19th
century, also used the press as an ‘emancipatory’ force. Cook
18
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[1965, p. 213] refers to Mitchell as a “Radical journalist” who
was antagonistic towards the Tory regime. Mitchell attempted to
increase public awareness of the state of the Tyne, stimulate
opposition against current practice and thus encourage positive
action to improve the river and benefit Newcastle as a whole.
Mitchell [1823, p. 121] commented that: “The corporation has
received this year [1822] the enormous sum of £19,148.6s.7d.
from dues, &c. from the Tyne. Have they, then, expended a
single farthing on the improvement of that river? There is no
notice of any such expenditure in the accounts!”
The development of the argument for change can be seen
from a petition which was lodged with the Corporation almost
20 years later by 120 of the oldest and most respected mer-
cantile firms, bankers and tradesmen of the borough. They
complained that the large proportion of the Corporation’s rev-
enue derived from the river but was not allocated fairly. The
river was not being improved to enable new trading relations to
prosper. From the published accounts the petitioners found that
the gross revenue from the Tyne during 1837-1839 was
£79,575.6s.4d., and the total expenditure on improvements only
£35,168.9s.7d. This meant that there was on average an excess
of £14,802 each year from the river but which was spent else-
where. The petitioners then examined the level of rates levied on
the town and found that £10,689 was raised but £28,418 ex-
pended on the service of the town, such as improvement, water-
ing, lighting, and scavenging. This meant that on average an
excess of £5,909 each year was spent on the town but not raised
by the town.
Opposition also came from disaffected councilors who were
aware of the the handsome return the Corporation received
from the River Tyne. They pressed hard in Corporation meetings
for further revenues to be voted to the River Committee. These
councillors made liberal reference to the accounts when making
their case. One councillor said:
Let then [the Corporation] take the book of their re-
ceipts and expenditure, and ask themselves where the
revenue which they had to expend came from? In the
balance sheet, the first class of receipts were, port and
harbour dues on coals, ships and boat, goods and mer-
chandise, and for conveying ballast by which 19,975l.
were brought to account. Now that large sum came
directly out of the river. If the river were dried up to-
morrow, not one farthing of that 19,900l. would they
get [NTCP, 1839, p. 8].
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Further, a ‘Statement Respecting the Port of Newcastle
upon Tyne’ by Dyson, Hall and Parkes, Parliamentary Agents,
1840 stated “The complaints made of the present system seem
borne by the statements of the official servants of the Corpora-
tion (who used the accounts) as well as by their published ac-
counts”. Another councillor considered that: “The Council
would not find a safer nor a better investment; and he was not
alone in thinking that it was to the river they must look for
improved commerce and trade in this port; and that they should
be careful to augment the great artery which supplied them with
the larger part of their revenue” [NTCP, 1845, p. 74].
One councillor in particular (Straker), who was a Newcastle
merchant and user of the River Tyne, was a very outspoken
member of the Corporation. He used information in the ac-
counts as a basis for his allegations against certain members of
the Corporation over a number of years and accused the engi-
neer of the river with mismanagement, misconduct, jobbery,
and waste. When altering a road in a field at Walker “which cost
a considerable sum, and no account of it in the engineer’s ac-
counts” the amount was entered in the groins account, i.e. a
river account. Straker held that the alteration had nothing to do
with the groins, and thus the river, but was made for the conve-
nience of a public house and should not be placed in this ac-
count. The River Committee knew nothing about this expendi-
ture supposedly made by them: “It surely cannot be understood,
that when money is given for the river, it is to be wasted in this
matter” [NTCP, 1839, p. 103]. The River Committee itself also
came under heavy fire, it being “were not particular in the ex-
penditure of the money awarded to them. They gave in an esti-
mate for one thing, and spent the money upon another” [NTCP,
1841, p.122]. Further, “the River Committee had all along mis-
managed matters. A great sum had been lost . . . Hunter’s Quay
had been pulled down four times and rebuilt” [NTCP, 1842, p.
122].
Even though these allegations were not proven, the episode,
which was highly publicized at well-attended public meetings
and in the local newspapers, increased the distrust in the
Corporation’s accountability.
Strong opposition also came from interested parties using
the Tyne in areas surrounding Newcastle who did not have a
voice on the Corporation. The towns of the Shields and Gates-
head strongly argued that the river suffered due to the relative
financial advantage of the inhabitants of Newcastle over their
neighbors. The “petty jealousy of sister towns” influenced
20
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Newcastle councillors who were unwilling to spend what they
saw as Newcastle income on other towns on the river [Mac-
gregor, 1832, p. 117]. It was argued that the seaward boroughs
“just influence in the confederation [be] heartily acknowledged”
and the “incubus of clerical seigniorage put to flight” before any
working agreement could be reached [ibid]. “Down to 1848 all
Custom business for the port had to be transacted at Newcastle,
no matter where the vessel loaded, although North and South
Shields together owned more shipping than Newcastle, and the
greater part of Tyne based vessels loaded and discharges in
Shields harbour” [Hodgson, 1903, p. 199].
It was considered a “great hardship that [the Shields towns]
should be compelled to pay for landing goods at Newcastle
which do not come within ten miles of it” [NTCP, 1834, p. 47].
The relentless petitioning by the people of Shields finally paid
off in 1848 when the Port of Newcastle was split — Port of Tyne
and Port of Shields — and an extra controller was established at
North Shields. A year later the people of Shields petitioned the
House of Commons for total independence from Newcastle on
the basis that: “1st, that this body had mismanaged the river;
2ndly, that it had grossly misappropriated its revenue; and
3rdly, that the powers and authorities by which these deeds had
been committed, should be transferred to new hands” [NTCP,
1849, pp. 50-51].
The Defense of the Corporation: Just as information in the pub-
lished accounts was used to attack the inaction of the Corpora-
tion, the same accounts were utilized by the Corporation to jus-
tify their lack of expenditure on the River Tyne. The accounting
data was used in support of the Corporation’s “Penny Wise”
system of avoiding debt and reducing costs based. One river
engineer, Richardson [1836, p.10], reporting on the Tyne com-
mented that “The first report of the Financial Committee has
been published and shows plainly enough, that any considerable
outlay for the improvement of the River, is wholly impracti-
cable” as the Corporation’s funds were not adequate. However,
in his concluding comments Richardson acknowledged that
“where improvement is practicable, it would be unwise to with-
hold the attempt given any over scrupulous consideration of
expense, for in the preservation, if not the improvement of the
navigation of the Tyne, Newcastle is entirely dependent” [ibid,
p.15].
The Corporation vote, dominated by the purse holders (the
Finance Committee), believed that the river was improved
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enough to accommodate increasing trade. The accounts also
proved that there was no money to fund further improvement. It
was also argued that “They could not borrow money for the
river. It was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Municipal
Reform Act. They were not to expend capital for outlay over
revenue” [NTCP, 1839, p. 3]. The Municipal Reform Act, 1835
stated that revenues that ought to be applied for the public ad-
vantage should not be diverted from their legitimate use, and
not be squandered for the benefit of individuals. The ‘spirit’ of
the Act refers to corporations using their revenue appropriately
instead of spending it wastefully and making up shortfalls by
borrowing. At a Finance Committee meeting, one councillor
commented that the Corporation “had expended more than their
revenue by 4000l. during the last 4 years, and had run that much
in debt. Now was it not more prudent to pay off a portion of that
balance, than to go on running into more debt?” [NTCP, Dec
1845, p. 60]. This councillor later criticized the River Committee
for continuously over-spending their allocated budget. He also
claimed that the expenditure of the River Committee brought no
benefit: “Why, there was no possibility of binding them down to
their allotted revenue; much less to any intelligible or tangible
plan of expending it upon the river. The Corporation would not
only be condemned, but justly so, if they continued to disburse
enormous sums upon the river, year after year, from which,
after all, no proportionate or substantial benefit was derived”
[ibid, pp. 72-73].
More pressure was placed on the limited funds for river
improvement in 1846. The usual policy of the Finance Commit-
tee of the Newcastle Corporation, was to estimate total revenue,
make allocations for “unavoidable” expenses and divide the re-
mainder (often equally) between the River and Town Improve-
ment Committees. The Corporation was able to justify their
policy of revenue allocation through what was considered a
“more wholesome principle” to their budgeting system, the cre-
ation of a surplus fund of £2,000 to cover any “unexpected calls
upon the corporate funds”, “public improvement” or to “be ap-
plied in the reduction of the debt” [NTCP, 1846, pp. 379-380].
This approach reduced the funds available for river improve-
ment further. However, the policy was overhauled in 1849 due
to the far poorer state of the Corporation finances: “The Finance
Committee do not think it prudent to appropriate more of that
amount than can by possibility be avoided [and so the Commit-
tees were], limited as nearly as possible to the amount of their
fixed charges. . . . The Finance Committee are aware that such a
22
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limitation would put a stop to all river works” [NTCP, 1849,
p.14]. By the end of the 1840s the Corporation’s inaction in
improving the River Tyne had reached breaking point.
Admiralty Enquiry: Dissatisfaction over the conditions and con-
trol of the river became so acute that in 1849 a parliamentary
bill was deposited by the people of Shields opposed to the
Newcastle Corporation’s inaction. This proposed to take river
dues and control of the Tyne out of the hands of the Corporation
of Newcastle and entrust them to Commissioners elected for the
purpose. The Corporation, seeing the opposition’s bill as a threat
to what they viewed as their “hereditary rights to river dues”,
and fearful of losing the voting power and revenues from the
river to a Commission representing interested parties outside
Newcastle, framed their own bill — The Tyne Improvement Bill,
1849. In the latter it was argued (as before) that under the con-
cept of prudence, there were insufficient funds to increase ex-
penditure on the river and in any case the Corporation were
doing enough. The opposing bills sparked two ‘Admiralty Enqui-
ries’ in 1849. The minutes of Newcastle Corporation during the
time of the first ‘Enquiry’ typically show the Corporation’s atti-
tude:
. . . it is evident that change is going on [to the river] . . .
the assertion that the expenditure upon the river
formed a good investment for money, involved a bad
principle . . . investments should be made advisedly, not
incidentally . . . he believed that [the river would not be
taken from their control] unless the Council became lax
and inattentive [NTCP, 1849, p. 47].
Captain Washington headed the investigation into the man-
agement and condition of the River Tyne. He gave an account of
the various river dues collected by the Corporation and the man-
ner in which they had been expended. Ultimately, it was ac-
counting data that was chiefly drawn on in these investigations.
The enquiry found:
That on average for the past seven years the income
derived from the river has exceeded 26,000l a year,
while the sum laid out in improvements has been less
than 5,000l a year. . . . From an inspection of the
Corporation’s accounts of the last year it seems that the
receipts from the river were 27,907l and the expendi-
ture, including salaries &c. 10,824l, showing a balance
otherwise appropriated of rather more than 17,000l. In
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the column of payments it will be seen that the cost of
watching the borough for the past year was 6,229l,
whereas the rate levied for watching was only 3,774l . . .
thus showing a deficiency of rates of 17,447l [A.E.,
1849, p. 3].
Captain Washington concluded that:
According to an abstract of accounts which had been
put in by the Treasurer to the Corporation, the whole
amount received from the river since 1809 (when the
accounts were first printed) had been 957,973l; whilst
the whole sum laid out on the river; including all
charges for conveying ballast, salaries, management,
&c., during that period, had been 397,719l — the differ-
ence between those two sums, exceeding half a million
of money, having been appropriated to the lightening,
paving, watering and scavenging the streets of
Newcastle [AE, 1849, p. 4].
A report in the North and South Shields Gazette shows the
influence of this investigation on the fate Tyne:
The evidence of gross mismanagement of the River
Tyne and misappropriation of funds levied for its con-
servation was so perfectly astounding to the Admiralty
Court . . . that the conclusion arrived at by the Admi-
ralty was that such evidence had never before been
heard respecting any river, and that this important
harbour and river should not be trifled with any longer
[1850].
Ultimately, it was decided by Parliament that, under the
River Tyne Improvement Act, 1850, the control of the River
should be taken from Newcastle Corporation and placed in the
hands of a trust called the Tyne Improvement Commission. This
Commission “embarked upon a major series of port improve-
ments which enabled the Tyne to survive as a major port”
[McCord, 1979, p. 77]. The Commission successfully controlled
the Tyne over the next 100 years. The Commission’s success can
be seen clearly by the following comment: “One of the most far-
reaching changes in human history took place between 1850
and 1914, when the volume of international trade probably in-
creased ten-fold in this relatively short period . . . [aided by] the
more sophisticated harbour facilities” [Newcastle City Libraries,
1969, p. 1].
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/4
69Brackenborough: ‘Pound Foolish Penny Wise’ System
CONCLUSION
The paper has focused on the use of accounting data by
Newcastle Corporation and its opponents in the debate over the
improvement of the River Tyne. Significant municipal reform
took place in early 19th century Britain. Corporations were
made more accountable to the ratepayers of their districts under
the Municipal Reform Act, 1835. The provisions of the Munici-
pal Corporations Act, also of 1835, made the neglect of the River
Tyne clearer when a new form of keeping accounts was adopted
and made public by the newly reformed Corporation. It has
been shown that opposition fuelled by the increasing availability
of accounting data put greater pressure on the Corporation. The
Corporation’s “Pound Foolish, Penny Wise” system was made
visible and was no longer tolerated.
The marginal improvement that the Corporation did make
to the River Tyne was, as one councillor put it in 1845, like
“illustrating the old proverb of putting money into a bag of
holes”. “All the time, labour, and money, bestowed by the Corpo-
ration during this period may be said to have been almost bar-
ren of beneficial results” [Walker, 1905 p. 6]. The published
accounts were used against the Corporation to campaign for
river improvement, and it was with these accounts that the Cor-
poration tried to justify inaction. Gallhofer and Haslam [2001, p.
29] showed how in the late 19th century “radical political activ-
ists” used accounting data by the medium of the press as an
“emancipatory” force. Significantly, a key factor enabling the
opposition’s campaign for the improvement of the Tyne was the
press and the use accounting data in the same ‘emancipatory’
way.
This research into the use of accounting in a single corpora-
tion suggests the potential for further historical investigations.
How the accountability of other corporations changed after the
municipal reform of 1835 would also be useful area of research.
It would be interesting to know if the Newcastle case was excep-
tional and whether the increased accountability through the
publication of accounts placed any other corporations in com-
promising situations where they were stripped of control over
key assets.
REFERENCES
A.I.: Admiralty Enquiry 1849.
Armstrong, P. (1994), “The Influence of Michel Foucault on Accounting Re-
search,” Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol.5, No.1: 25-55.
25
Brackenborough: 2003
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200370
Armstrong, W.G. (1836), Observations of the Improvement of the Navigation of
the Tyne, (Newcastle: Emerson Charnley).
Callon, M. (1980), “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication
of the Scallops and Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay” in J. Law (ed.) Power
Action and Belief: a New Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul): 196-233.
Cook, M. (1961), “The Last Days of the Unreformed Corporation”, Archaeologia
Aeliana, Vol.39, 4th Series: 217-232.
Coombs, H.M. and Edwards, J.R. (1993), “The Accountability of Municipal Cor-
porations,” Abacus, Vol. 29, No. 1: 26-52.
Coombs, H.M. and Edwards, J.R. (1996), Accounting Innovation, Municipal Cor-
porations 1835-1935 (New York: Garland Publishing).
Edwards, J.R. (1992), “Companies, Corporations and Accounting Change, 1835-
1933,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 23, No. 89: 59-73.
Edwards, J.R., Anderson, M. and Matthews, D. (1997), “Accountability in a Free-
Market Economy: The British Company Audit, 1886,” Abacus, Vol. 33, No.1:
1-25
Fraser, D. (1979), Power and Authority in the Victorian City (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell).
Gallhofer, S. and Haslam, J. (2001), “Mobilising Accounting in Labour Disputes
and the Strategies of Radical Political Movements: Some Late Nineteenth
Century Episodes.” Paper presented at British Accounting Association Con-
ference, Nottingham.
Guthrie, J. (1880), The River Tyne its History and Resources (Newcastle: Andrew
Reid).
Halcrow, E. (1953), “Mr. Treasurer – Newcastle upon Tyne before 1835”, Local
Government Finance Journal, July, 151-153; September, 200-202.
Hein, L.W. (1978), The British Companies Acts and the Practice of Accountancy
1844-1962 (New York: Arno Press).
Hodgson, G. (1903), The Borough of South Shields, From the Earliest Period to the
Close of the Nineteenth Century (Newcastle: Andrew Reid).
Johnson, R.W. and Aughton, R. (1925), The River Tyne, its Trade and Facilities
(Newcastle: Andrew Reid & Co. Ltd).
Jones, R.H. (1986), The Financial Control Function of Local Government Account-
ing, PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham.
Jones, R.H. (1989), “On Local Government Accounting History. The Case of
Central Establishment Charges,” Financial Accountability and Management,
Vol. 5, No. 2: 59-71.
Jones, R.H. (1992), “Accounting in English Local Government from the Middle
Ages to c.1835,” Accounting and Business Research, Vol.22, No. 89: 197-209.
Jones, S. and Aiken, M. (1995), “British Companies Legislation and Social and
Political Evolution during the Nineteenth Century,” British Accounting Re-
view, Vol. 27, No. 1: 71-82.
Latour, B. (1986), “The Powers of Association”, in J. Law (ed.) Power Action and
Belief: a New Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul):
196-233.
Latour, B. (1987), Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers
through Society (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).
Livock, D.M. (1965), “The Accounts of the Corporation of Bristol: 1532 to 1835,”
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.3, No.1: 86-102.
McCord, N. (1979), North East England: An Economic and Social History (Lon-
don: Batsford Academic).
26
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/4
71Brackenborough: ‘Pound Foolish Penny Wise’ System
Macgregor, J., (1832), Observations on the River Tyne with a View to the Improve-
ment of its Navigation (Newcastle: J. & J. Hodgson).
Mackenzie, E. (1827), A Descriptive and Historical Account of the Town and
County of Newcastle upon Tyne, Vol. II (Newcastle: Andrew Reid).
Maltby, J. (1999), “‘A Sort of Guide, Philosopher and Friend’: The Rise of the
Professional Auditor in Britain,” Accounting, Business & Financial History,
Vol. 9, No.1: 29-50.
M.C.I. : Municipal Corporation Inquiry, 1833/4.
Miller, P., (1990), “On the Interactions between Accounting and the State,” Ac-
counting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 15, No.4: 315-338.
Miller, P., (1991), “Accounting Innovation Beyond the Enterprise: Problematiz-
ing Investment Decisions and Programming Economic Growth in the U.K.
in the 1960s,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 16, No.8: 733-762.
Miller, P. and O’Leary, T. (1989), “Hierarchies and American Ideals 1900-1940,”
Academy of Management Review, Vol.14, No. 2: 250-265.
Miller, P. and O’Leary, T. (1990), “Making Accounting Practical,” Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol.15, No.5: 479-498.
Mitchell, W.A. (1823), The Letters of Tim Tunbelly Gent.(Newcastle: W.A.
Mitchell).
Nikitin, M. (2001), “The Birth of a Modern Public Sector Accounting System in
France and Britain and the Influence of Count Mollien,” Accounting History,
Vol. 6, No. 1: 75-101.
Neu, D. (1999), “Discovering Indigenous Peoples: Accounting and the Machinery
of Empire.” Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26, No.1: 75-101.
Newcastle City Libraries, (1969) Looking Back at the Tyne (Newcastle: Newcastle
City Libraries).
Newcastle Corporation, (1809) Report on the Proceedings of the Auditors of the
Accounts of the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne, (Gateshead: J.
Marshall).
Newcastle Corporation, (1849), An Account of the Gross Income and Expenditure
of the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne as Published Annually for the Last
Forty Years (Newcastle: Hugh McColl).
N.T.C.P. : Newcastle Town Council Proceedings (1836-1851).
Oldroyd, D. (2001), “Historical Trends in the Development of Accounting Prac-
tice,” Newcastle University Discussion Paper in Accounting and Finance,
No.2001/1.
Preston, A.M. (1992), “The Birth of Clinical Accounting: a study of the Emer-
gence and Transformation of Discourses on Cost and Practices of Account-
ing in US Hospitals,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol.17, No.1:
63-100.
Port of Tyne Authority (1999), Port of Tyne: The First Two Thousand Years (Brit-
ish Publishing Company Ltd.)
River Committee (1836), Papers relating to the River Tyne, (Newcastle: T&J
Hodgson).
Robson, K. (1991), “On the Arenas of Accounting Change: the Process of Trans-
lation,” Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol.16, No.5/6: 547-570.
Rose, N. (1991), “Governing by Numbers: Figuring out Democracy,” Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 16, No.7: 673-692.
Storrar, A.C. and Pratt, K.C. (2000), “Accountability vs. Privacy, 1844-1907: The
Coming of the Private Company,” Accounting, Business and Financial His-
tory, Vol.10, No.3: 259-291.
Tyne Mercury (1833 and 1838).
27
Brackenborough: 2003
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200372
Walker, J. (1905), The Tyne as a Navigable River, (Newcastle: Andrew Reid).
Watts, R.L. and Zimmermann, J.L. (1979), “The Demand and Supply of Account-
ing Theories: the Market for Excuses,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 54, No.
2: 273-305.
Webb, S. and B. (1906, 1908), English Local Government from the Revolution to
the Municipal Corporations Act: the Manor and the Borough, Parts I & II
(London: Longman).
28
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/4
